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Abstract
In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for trans-
ferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining
procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egal-
itarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained
egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which
exists for any TU-game.
Keywords: egalitarianism, egalitarian procedure, procedural egalitarian solution, egal-
itarian stability, constrained equal awards rule
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1 Introduction
Egalitarianism is a paradigm of economic thought that favors the idea of equality. Economic
equality, or equity, refers to the concept of fairness in economics and underlies many theories
of distributive justice. Starting from the seminal work of Rawls (1971) in which equality plays
a central role in two fundamental principles of justice, egalitarianism and equity have inspired
scientists within several areas, e.g. social philosophy and welfare economics. Young (1995)
provides a rich survey on equity concepts in both theoretical and practical contexts. We
focus on the role of egalitarianism in distributive justice applied to coalitional arrangements
which affect the distribution of joint revenues among cooperating participants.
Dutta and Ray (1989) introduced a concept of egalitarianism under participation con-
straints for transferable utility games. A transferable utility game describes an allocation
problem for a set of cooperating players in which the economic possibilities of all subcoalitions
are taken into account. The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) uses
a specific Lorenz criterion to select a payoff allocation. Their most important result states
that the constrained egalitarian solution selects at most one feasible allocation, despite the
partial ordering generated by the Lorenz criterion. However, existence of the constrained
egalitarian solution is only guaranteed for the special class of convex games.
The constrained egalitarian solution is well-studied on the class of convex games. Dutta
and Ray (1989) showed that the constrained egalitarian solution of a convex game cannot
be blocked by any subcoalition, i.e. it is an element of the core. Dutta (1990) axiomatically
characterized the constrained egalitarian solution on the class of convex games using consis-
tency properties for reduced games of Davis and Maschler (1965) and Hart and Mas-Colell
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(1989). Other characterizations of the constrained egalitarian solution on the class of con-
vex games are provided by Klijn, Slikker, Tijs, and Zarzuelo (2000) and Arin, Kuipers, and
Vermeulen (2003).
Another line of research studies egalitarian concepts similar to the constrained egalitarian
solution for a wider class of transferable utility games. Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2006)
extended the computational algorithm for locating the constrained egalitarian solution of
convex games to superadditive games by introducing the equal split-off set. Arin and Iñarra
(2001) applied an egalitarian criterion to the core of balanced games by introducing the egal-
itarian core which satisfies the consistency property for reduced games of Davis and Maschler
(1965). Both the equal split-off set and the egalitarian core coincide with the constrained
egalitarian solution on the class of convex games. The most important shortcoming of these
notions is that they generally lack the fundamental uniqueness property of the constrained
egalitarian solution. To our knowledge, no appropriate egalitarian, single-valued solution
concept is defined in the literature which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution
on the class of convex games and exists for any TU-game.
In this paper we introduce the procedural egalitarian solution as an egalitarian solution
concept for which existence and uniqueness is guaranteed for any transferable utility game.
Moreover, it coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on
the class of convex games. The procedural egalitarian solution follows from an egalitarian
procedure which is inspired by ideas underlying the average rules for cooperative TU-games
of Sugumaran, Thangaraj, and Ravindran (2013). The egalitarian procedure models a nat-
ural way of negotiating by members of coalitions about an egalitarian distribution of their
worth, taking into account their coalitional egalitarian externalities. The egalitarian pro-
cedure converges to a steady state in which each player has acquired a claim attainable in
one or more egalitarian admissible coalitions. Using the constrained equal awards rule, the
procedural egalitarian solution allocates the worth of the grand coalition in an egalitarian
way among the players, taking into account their claims.
Selten (1972) proved that egalitarian allocations successfully explain outcomes of experi-
mental cooperative games. Experimental evidence clearly suggests that equity considerations
have a strong influence on observed payoff divisions. Coalition members look for easily acces-
sible cues like equitable shares in order to form aspiration levels for their payoffs (cf. Selten
(1987)). The egalitarian procedure seamlessly connects this phenomenon with transferable
utility games.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of the basic
game theoretic notions and notations. Section 3 formally introduces the egalitarian procedure
and studies its underlying structure. In Section 4, we introduce the procedural egalitarian
solution, we derive some of its properties and we show that it coincides with the constrained
egalitarian solution on the class of convex games. Section 5 concludes and formulates some
suggestions for future research.
2
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of players. The set of all coalitions is denoted by
2N = {S | S ⊆ N}. For any i, j ∈ N the involution σi,j : 2N → 2N is for all S ∈ 2N given by
σi,j(S) =

(S ∪ {j}) \ {i} if i ∈ S and j /∈ S;
(S ∪ {i}) \ {j} if i /∈ S and j ∈ S;
S if i, j ∈ S or i, j /∈ S.
A collection of coalitions B ⊆ 2N \ {∅} is called a cover if
⋃
S∈B S = N . A set B ⊆ 2N \ {∅}
is called balanced if there exists a function λ : 2N \ {∅} → [0, 1] with
∑
S∈2N :i∈S λ(S) = 1 for
all i ∈ N such that B = {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} | λ(S) > 0}.
A transferable utility game (cf. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)) is a pair (N, v)
in which v : 2N → R is a characteristic function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N its worth
v(S) ∈ R such that v(∅) = 0. The number v(S)|S| is called the average worth of S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}.
Let TUN denote the class of all transferable utility games with player set N . For convenience,
we abbreviate (N, v) ∈ TUN to v ∈ TUN . For any v ∈ TUN the subgame vS ∈ TUS on
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} is given by vS(R) = v(R) for all R ∈ 2S . A TU-game v ∈ TUN is called
– superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N for which S ∩ T = ∅;
– convex (cf. Shapley (1971)) if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N ;
– balanced (cf. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)) if
∑
S∈2N\{∅} λ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N)
for every λ : 2N \ {∅} → [0, 1] with
∑
S∈2N :i∈S λ(S) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Note that convexity implies superadditivity. Shapley (1971) showed that convexity implies












Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed that C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is balanced.
A solution for transferable utility games f : TUN → RN assigns to any v ∈ TUN a payoff
allocation f(v) ∈ RN .
A bankruptcy problem (cf. O’Neill (1982)) is a triple (N,E, c) in which E ∈ R is the estate
and c ∈ RN is the vector of claims of N on E for which
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E. Note that the standard
non-negativity conditions on E and c are dropped here for technical convenience later on.
Let BRN denote the class of all such bankruptcy problems with player set N . A bankruptcy
rule f : BRN → RN assigns to any bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff allocation
f(N,E, c) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N fi(N,E, c) = E and f(N,E, c) ≤ c. The constrained equal
awards rule CEA : BRN → RN is for all (N,E, c) ∈ BRN and any i ∈ N given by
CEAi(N,E, c) = min{ci, αN,E,c},
in which αN,E,c = min{t ∈ R |
∑
i∈N min{ci, t} = E}.
3
3 The Egalitarian Procedure
In this section we introduce the egalitarian procedure for transferable utility games. This
iterative procedure models negotiations between members of coalitions about the allocation
of their worth, taking into account their coalitional egalitarian externalities. We formally
define the egalitarian procedure after an illustrative example.
Example 1.
Let v ∈ TUN be a transferable utility game with N = {1, 2, 3}. The table shows the worth of
each coalition and the egalitarian distribution in each iteration of the egalitarian procedure.
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 5 0 0 8 4 2 9
χv,1(S) (5, ·, ·) (·, 0, ·) (·, ·, 0) (4, 4, ·) (2, ·, 2) (·, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3)
χv,2(S) (5, ·, ·) (·, 0, ·) (·, ·, 0) (5, 3, ·) (5, ·,−1) (·, 1, 1) (5, 2, 2)
χv,3(S) (5, ·, ·) (·, 3, ·) (·, ·, 0) (5, 3, ·) (5, ·,−1) (·, 3,−1) (5, 3, 1)
χv,k(S) (k ≥ 4) (5, ·, ·) (·, 3, ·) (·, ·, 1) (5, 3, ·) (5, ·, 1) (·, 3, 1) (5, 3, 1)
A natural way to start negotiating about the allocation of the worth of a coalition among
its members is to divide it equally, i.e., in the first iteration, the egalitarian distribution
χv,1 allocates in any coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} the average worth v(S)|S| to each member i ∈ S.
Players can only claim their highest allocated payoff if no other member of the corresponding
coalition is allocated a higher payoff in any other coalition. All such players constitute the
set of egalitarian claimants P v,1 with corresponding claims γv,1, and the coalitions in which
they obtained their claims are contained in the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions
Av,1.
The highest payoff allocated by χv,1 to player 1 is 5 in coalition {1}, which player 1 can
claim since this coalition contains no other members. The highest payoff allocated to player 2
is 4 in coalition {1, 2}, which player 2 cannot claim since player 1 is allocated a higher payoff
in another coalition. The highest payoff allocated to player 3 is 3 in coalition {1, 2, 3}, which
player 3 cannot claim since player 1 and 2 are allocated a higher payoff in other coalitions.
This means that the set of 1-egalitarian claimants is given by P v,1 = {1}, the corresponding
vector of 1-egalitarian claims is given by γv,1 = (5, ·, ·), and the collection of 1-egalitarian
admissible coalitions is given by Av,1 = {{1}}.
In a next iteration, the claimants claim their egalitarian claim in any coalition of which
they are member and χv,2 divides the remaining worth equally among the other members.
The claimants in P v,2 and their corresponding claims γv,2 are constituted similarly to the
first iteration, and Av,2 contains the coalitions in which all members can obtain their claims.
In this way, the players continue negotiating in further iterations. Note that, once a player
has acquired an egalitarian claim, it remains fixed in all further iterations.
In particular, the highest payoff allocated by χv,2 to player 2 is 3 in coalition {1, 2}, which
player 2 can claim since no other member is allocated a higher payoff in any other coalition.
The highest payoff allocated to player 3 is 2 in coalition {1, 2, 3}, which player 3 cannot
claim since player 2 is allocated a higher payoff in another coalition. This means that we
have P v,2 = {1, 2}, γv,2 = (5, 3, ·) and Av,2 = {{1}, {1, 2}}. In the third iteration, the highest
payoff allocated by χv,3 to player 3 is 1 in coalition {1, 2, 3}, which player 3 can claim. We
have P v,3 = {1, 2, 3}, γv,3 = (5, 3, 1) and Av,3 = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}. Note that coalition
{2} is not egalitarian admissible, since the egalitarian distribution allocates more than the
worth of coalition {2}. In all further iterations, all players are allocated their claims in each
coalition of which they are member, and the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions
remains unchanged. 4
4
Definition 1 (The Egalitarian Procedure).
Let v ∈ TUN be a transferable utility game. The set of 0-egalitarian claimants is given by
P v,0 = ∅. Let k ∈ N. The k-egalitarian distribution is the function χv,k assigning to each
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} the payoff allocation χv,k(S) ∈ RS given by
χv,ki (S) =
{






|S\Pv,k−1| if i ∈ S \ P
v,k−1.
The collection of k-egalitarian admissible coalitions is given by Av,k = {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} |∑
i∈S χ
v,k
i (S) = v(S),∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : χ
v,k
i (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (S)}. The set of k-egalitarian claimants
P v,k ∈ 2N \{∅} is given by P v,k =
⋃
S∈Av,k S. The vector of k-egalitarian claims γ
v,k ∈ RPv,k
is for all i ∈ P v,k given by γv,ki = χ
v,k
i (S), where i ∈ S ∈ Av,k.
The payoff χv,ki (S) allocated to a player i ∈ S \ P v,k−1 is called the average remaining
worth of S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. A typical observation is that a k-egalitarian distribution is in general
overefficient, i.e. it possibly allocates more than the worth of a coalition.
Lemma 3.1.




i (S) ≥ v(S) for all k ∈ N. Moreover, if




i (S) = v(S).







































χv,ki (S) ≥ v(S).













































By definition, only coalitions for which the egalitarian distribution allocates exactly the
worth among its members can be egalitarian admissible. The question arises whether egal-
itarian admissible coalitions exist in each iteration for any transferable utility game. We
show that in each iteration of the egalitarian procedure at least one extra player becomes
an egalitarian claimant as long as the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions is not a
cover, which implies that egalitarian admissible coalitions indeed always exist.
Lemma 3.2.
Let v ∈ TUN . Then Av,k ⊆ Av,k+1 for all k ∈ N. Moreover, if P v,k−1 6= N for some k ∈ N,
then P v,k−1 ⊂ P v,k.
Proof. Let k ∈ N and assume that P v,k−1 6= N . Let S ∈ 2N with S 6⊆ P v,k−1 be the coalition





v(S). Moreover, for all i ∈ S we have χv,ki (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (S) for all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T . This
means that S ∈ Av,k and S ⊆ P v,k.








χv,ki (S) = v(S).
Moreover, for all i ∈ S we have χv,k+1i (T ) ≤ χ
v,k+1
i (S) for all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T . This
means that S ∈ Av,k+1.
Lemma 3.2 not only tells us that egalitarian admissible coalitions always exist, but also
that the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions weakly extends in each iteration. The
structure of this collection is determined by the structure of the underlying transferable utility
game. It turns out that well-known properties of TU-games have interesting implications for
the structure of the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions in each iteration. We derive
those implications for superadditive, convex and balanced transferable utility games.
Proposition 3.3.
Let v ∈ TUN and let k ∈ N.
(i) If v is superadditive, then S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Av,k for all S1, S2 ∈ Av,k with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
(ii) If v is convex, then S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Av,k and S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Av,k for all S1, S2 ∈ Av,k.
(iii) If v is balanced, then N ∈ Av,k if there exists a balanced collection B with B ⊆ Av,k.
Proof. (i) Assume that v is superadditive. Let S1, S2 ∈ Av,k with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Then we




i (S1 ∪ S2) ≥ v(S1 ∪ S2). We can write










χv,ki (S1 ∪ S2) +
∑
i∈S2
χv,ki (S1 ∪ S2) =
∑
i∈S1∪S2
χv,ki (S1 ∪ S2)





i (S1 ∪ S2) = v(S1 ∪ S2). Moreover, for all i ∈ S1 ∪ S2 we have
χv,ki (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (S1 ∪ S2) for all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T . Hence, S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Av,k.
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(ii) Assume that v is convex. Let S1, S2 ∈ Av,k. Then we know from Lemma 3.1 that∑
i∈S1∪S2 χ
v,k




i (S1∩S2) ≥ v(S1∩S2). We can write

























χv,ki (S1 ∪ S2) +
∑
i∈S1∩S2
χv,ki (S1 ∩ S2)









i (S1 ∩ S2) = v(S1 ∩ S2).
Moreover, for all i ∈ S1 ∪S2 we have χv,ki (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (S1 ∪S2) for all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T ,
and for all i ∈ S1 ∩ S2 we have χv,ki (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (S1 ∩ S2) for all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T .
Hence, S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Av,k and S1 ∩ S2 ∈ Av,k.
(iii) Assume that v is balanced. Let B ⊆ Av,k be a balanced collection and let λ : 2N \
{∅} → [0, 1] with
∑
S∈2N :i∈S λ(S) = 1 for all i ∈ N such that B = {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} | λ(S) > 0}.

















































i (N) = v(N). Moreover, for all i ∈ N we have χ
v,k
i (T ) ≤ χ
v,k
i (N) for
all T ∈ 2N for which i ∈ T . Hence, N ∈ Av,k.
The egalitarian procedure is an egalitarian bargaining model that takes participation
constraints explicitly into account. The egalitarian admissible coalitions can be considered as
the coalitions in which members prefer to participate, concerning the corresponding allocation
prescribed by the egalitarian distribution. This consideration suggests that the assigned
allocation, consisting of the egalitarian claim for each member, is stable against subcoalitional
deviations. Indeed, the vector of egalitarian claims corresponding to the members of an
egalitarian admissible coalition is an element of the core of the induced subgame.
Proposition 3.4.
Let v ∈ TUN and let k ∈ N. Then (γv,ki )i∈S ∈ C(vS) for all S ∈ Av,k.





χv,ki (S) = v(S) = vS(S).
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χv,ki (R) ≥ v(R) = vS(R).
Hence, (γv,ki )i∈S ∈ C(vS).
The egalitarian procedure reaches a steady state when the collection of egalitarian admis-
sible coalitions is a cover, i.e. all players have become egalitarian claimants. From Lemma
3.2 we know that the egalitarian procedure converges to this steady state within a number of
iterations which is bounded by the number of players in the underlying transferable utility
game.
The players stop negotiating when they all have acquired an egalitarian claim. Although
this egalitarian claim is bounded from below by the individual worth of the player, it is
possibly negative. Nevertheless, the egalitarian claims can be obtained in one or more egal-
itarian admissible coalitions. They form aspiration levels for the allocation of the worth of
the grand coalition. In the next section we further describe the egalitarian steady state and
we define the procedural egalitarian solution which allocates the worth of the grand coalition
in an egalitarian way among the players, taking into account their (generally overefficient)
egalitarian claims.
4 The Procedural Egalitarian Solution
In this section we introduce the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games.
This solution is based on the egalitarian steady state to which the egalitarian procedure
converges.
Definition 2.
Let v ∈ TUN be a transferable utility game. The egalitarian steady state iteration nv ∈
{1, . . . , |N |} is given by nv = min{k ∈ N | P v,k = N}. The vector of egalitarian claims
γ̂v ∈ RN is for all i ∈ N given by γ̂vi = γ
v,nv
i . The collection of maximal egalitarian
admissible coalitions Âv ⊆ 2N \ {∅} is given by Âv = {S ∈ Av,nv | ∀T∈Av,nv : S 6⊂ T}. The







i ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N and Av,n
v





Players can obtain their egalitarian claim in the egalitarian admissible coalitions of which
they are member. We only consider the inclusion-wise maximal egalitarian admissible coali-
tions. Players which are member of all maximal egalitarian admissible coalitions are called
strong egalitarian claimants. The procedural egalitarian solution assigns to the strong egali-
tarian claimants their claims, and divides the remaining worth of the grand coalition among
the other players according to the constrained equal awards rule, the standard concept of
egalitarianism in the context of bankruptcy problems.
Definition 3 (The Procedural Egalitarian Solution).















if i ∈ N \Dv.
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Note that an interesting situation arises when the grand coalition is egalitarian admis-
sible and consequently all players are strong egalitarian claimants. In such situation, the
underlying transferable utility game is called egalitarian stable.
Definition 4 (Egalitarian Stability).
A transferable utility game v ∈ TUN is called egalitarian stable if Âv = {N}.
If v ∈ TUN is egalitarian stable, we have Dv = N and Γ(v) = γ̂v. Moreover, from
Proposition 3.4 we know that Γ(v) ∈ C(v) if and only if v is egalitarian stable. The question
arises whether we can formulate conditions on TU-games which imply egalitarian stability.
Since the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions is a cover, we know from Proposition
3.3 that convexity is such a condition. Clearly, balancedness is a necessary condition for
egalitarian stability and from Proposition 3.3 we know that it is sufficient if there exists a
balanced collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions.
The following example studies egalitarian stability for the class of glove games and derives
the procedural egalitarian solution for a game for which the constrained egalitarian solution
of Dutta and Ray (1989) does not exist.
Example 2 (Glove Games).
In a glove game v ∈ TUN there exist L,R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that N = L ∪ R and L ∩ R = ∅.
Players in L are endowed with a left-hand glove and players in R are endowed with a right-
hand glove, but only pairs of one left-hand and one right-hand glove have value. The worth
of a coalition S ∈ 2N can therefore be described by v(S) = min{|L ∩ S|, |R ∩ S|}. In a glove
game, the egalitarian steady state is reached in the first iteration, i.e. nv = 1. Moreover, we
have Âv = {S ∈ 2N | v(S) = v(N), |L∩S| = |R∩S|} and γ̂vi = 12 for all i ∈ N . Consequently,
Dv =

L if |L| < |R|;
N if |L| = |R|;
R if |L| > |R|.
This means that a glove game is egalitarian stable if and only if |L| = |R|. The procedural
egalitarian solution divides a half per pair of gloves equally among the left-hand glove players,
and the other half per pair of gloves equally among the right-hand glove players.
Let v ∈ TUN be a glove game with L = {1} and R = {2, 3}. The table shows the
worth of each coalition and the egalitarian distribution in the first iteration of the egalitarian
procedure.
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
χv,1(S) (0, ·, ·) (·, 0, ·) (·, ·, 0) ( 12 ,
1















2 ). This means that Â
v =











Next, we study some basic properties of the procedural egalitarian solution. We show
that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies efficiency, symmetry, dummy invariance and
weak covariance. The properties are derived in the Appendix. Note that the procedural
egalitarian solution is not relative invariant with respect to strategic equivalence. In fact,
there does not exist a solution concept which satisfies relative invariance with respect to
strategic equivalence and coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution on the class of
convex games. We refer to Dutta and Ray (1989) for a discussion on why egalitarian solution
concepts actually should fail to satisfy this stronger covariance property.
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Definition 5 (Elementary Properties).
A solution for transferable utility games f : TUN → RN satisfies
– efficiency if for all v ∈ TUN we have
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N);
– symmetry if for all v ∈ TUN we have fi(v) = fj(v) for all i, j ∈ N for which v(σi,j(S)) =
v(S) for all S ∈ 2N ;
– dummy invariance if for all v ∈ TUN we have fi(v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N for which
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ∈ 2N with i /∈ S;
– weak covariance if for all v ∈ TUN and any a ∈ R++, b ∈ R we have fi(v′) = afi(v) + b
for all i ∈ N , where v′ ∈ TUN is given by v′(S) = av(S) + b|S| for all S ∈ 2N .
Theorem 4.1.
The procedural egalitarian solution satisfies efficiency, symmetry, dummy invariance, and
weak covariance.
We conclude this section with an analysis of the procedural egalitarian solution on the
class of convex games. We know that convex games are egalitarian stable. Moreover, the
constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) can be computed algorithmically
for convex games, as described by the following definition.
Definition 6 (The Constrained Egalitarian Solution (cf. Dutta and Ray (1989))).
Let v ∈ TUN be a convex transferable utility game. Let v0 = v and T v0 = ∅. For any k ∈ N,




s ) the worth vk(S) = vk−1(S∪T vk−1)−vk−1(T vk−1), where
T vk ∈ 2N \ {∅} is the largest coalition having the highest average worth in vk. For any k ∈ N,







The procedural egalitarian solution coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta
and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games.
Proof. Let v ∈ TUN be a convex transferable utility game. Since v is egalitarian stable, we
have Γ(v) = γ̂v.














s , and CESi(v) = γ̂
v
i for all i ∈ P v,k.
From Proposition 3.3 we know that for all k ∈ N we have S1 ∪ S2 ∈ Av,k for all S1, S2 ∈
Av,k. In particular, this implies that P v,k ∈ Av,k for all k ∈ N.
Using v0 = v, T
v
0 = ∅ and P v,0 = ∅, we can write for all S ⊆ N




For all S1, S2 ∈ Av,1, and any i ∈ S1 and j ∈ S2, we can write
v(S1)
|S1|
= χv,1i (S1) = χ
v,1
i (S1 ∪ S2) =
v(S1 ∪ S2)
|S1 ∪ S2|






This means that each 1-egalitarian admissible coalition has the highest average worth. Since
P v,1 ∈ Av,1, then P v,1 is the largest coalition with highest average worth in v1. Hence,




j for all S ⊆ N \ T v0 , P v,1 = T v1 , and CESi(v) = γ̂vi for all
i ∈ P v,1.
10














s for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and CESi(v) = γ̂vi for all i ∈ P v,k.





vk+1(S) = vk(S ∪ T vk )− vk(T vk )









= v(S ∪ P v,k)− v(P v,k)

























|(S ∪ P v,k) \ P v,k|
= χv,k+1i (S ∪ P
v,k).
From Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 we know that S ∪ P v,k ∈ Av,k+1 for all S ∈ Av,k+1.
For all S1, S2 ∈ Av,k+1, and any i ∈ S1 \ P v,k and j ∈ S2 \ P v,k, we can write
χv,k+1i (S1) = χ
v,k+1
i (S1 ∪ S2) = χ
v,k+1
j (S1 ∪ S2) = χ
v,k+1
j (S2).
This means that each coalition in Av,k+1 \ Av,k has the highest average remaining worth.
Then P v,k+1 \ P v,k is the largest coalition with highest average worth in vk+1.













s , and CESi(v) = γ̂
v
i for all i ∈ P v,k+1.
Example 3 (Bankruptcy Games).
In a nonnegative bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) ∈ BRN we have E ≥ 0 and c ∈ RN+ .
The bankruptcy game vE,c ∈ TUN (cf. O’Neill (1982)) corresponding to the nonnegative
bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) is given by vE,c(S) = max{E −
∑
i∈N\S ci, 0} for all S ∈ 2N .
Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987) showed that bankruptcy games are convex. This means
that the procedural egalitarian solution of a bankruptcy game coincides with the constrained
egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989), which equals the constrained equal awards rule
of the underlying bankruptcy problem.
Let (N,E, c) ∈ BRN be a bankruptcy problem with N = {1, 2, 3}, E = 12 and c =
(2, 6, 8). Then we have CEA(N,E, c) = (2, 5, 5). The table shows the worth of each coalition
in the corresponding bankruptcy game vE,c ∈ TUN and the egalitarian distribution in the
first two iterations of the egalitarian procedure.
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vE,c(S) 0 2 4 4 6 10 12
χv
E,c,1(S) (0, ·, ·) (·, 2, ·) (·, ·, 4) (2, 2, ·) (3, ·, 3) (·, 5, 5) (4, 4, 4)
χv
E,c,2(S) (0, ·, ·) (·, 5, ·) (·, ·, 5) (−1, 5, ·) (1, ·, 5) (·, 5, 5) (2, 5, 5)
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In the first iteration we have Av,1 = {{2, 3}}, P v,1 = {2, 3} and γv,1 = (·, 5, 5). In the second
iteration we have Av,2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, P v,2 = N and γv,2 = (2, 5, 5). This means that
Âv = {N}, Dv = N and γ̂v = (2, 5, 5). Consequently, Γ(v) = (2, 5, 5). 4
The next result follows immediately from the elucidation in Example 3. We refer to
Dietzenbacher (2014) for a direct proof.
Corollary 4.3.
The procedural egalitarian solution of a bankruptcy game coincides with the constrained equal
awards rule of the underlying bankruptcy problem.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this section we formulate some concluding remarks on the procedural egalitarian solution
and some suggestions for future research. We know that the procedural egalitarian solution
is single-valued and exists for any TU-game. Moreover, from Theorem 4.2 we know that it
coincides with the well-known constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on
the class of convex games. This means that the procedural egalitarian solution for convex
games is axiomatically characterized by Dutta (1990), Klijn et al. (2000) and Arin et al.
(2003). Future research could look for properties which extend axiomatic characterizations
of the procedural egalitarian solution for convex games to more general classes of games.
Transferable utility games for which the egalitarian solution is an element of the core are
called egalitarian stable. We know that convexity is a sufficient condition for a TU-game to
be egalitarian stable. Example 1 shows that this condition is not necessary. Balancedness
is trivially a necessary condition for a TU-game to be egalitarian stable. Example 2 shows
that this condition is not sufficient. The class of egalitarian stable games is the class of TU-
games for which the grand coalition is egalitarian admissible. Whether the grand coalition
is egalitarian admissible can be determined by applying the egalitarian procedure. Future
research could look for a characterization of the class of egalitarian stable transferable utility
games. This will contribute to a better understanding of situations in which egalitarianism
and coalitional rationality do not conflict.
Appendix
Lemma A.1.
The procedural egalitarian solution satisfies symmetry.
Proof. Let v ∈ TUN and let i1, i2 ∈ N such that v(σi1,i2(S)) = v(S) for all S ∈ 2N . For all









Using Lemma 3.1, we can write for all S ∈ Av,1 for which i1 ∈ S and i2 /∈ S
v(σi1,i2(S)) = v(S) =
∑
i∈S\{i1}





























(S) = χv,1i2 (σ
i1,i2(S)) = γv,1i2 .
Let k ∈ N and assume that χv,ki1 (S) = χ
v,k
i2
(σi1,i2(S)) for all S ∈ 2N \{∅} for which i1 ∈ S,
Av,k = {σi1,i2(S) | S ∈ Av,k}, P v,k = σi1,i2(P v,k) and γv,ki1 = γ
v,k
i2
if i1 ∈ P v,k. Then we can
write for all S ∈ 2N for which i1 ∈ S
χv,k+1i1 (S) =
{























Using Lemma 3.1, we can write for all S ∈ Av,k+1 for which i1 ∈ S and i2 /∈ S
v(σi1,i2(S)) = v(S) =
∑
i∈S\{i1}








i1,i2(S)) + χv,k+1i2 (σ
i1,i2(S))
≥ v(σi1,i2(S)).











 = σi1,i2(P v,k+1).




(S) = χv,k+1i2 (σ
i1,i2(S)) = γv,k+1i2 .
This means that for all k ∈ N we have χv,ki1 (S) = χ
v,k
i2
(σi1,i2(S)) for all S ∈ 2N \{∅} for which
i1 ∈ S, Av,k = {σi1,i2(S) | S ∈ Av,k}, P v,k = σi1,i2(P v,k) and γv,ki1 = γ
v,k
i2
if i1 ∈ P v,k. Then





















Then we can write
Γi1(v) =
{












if i1 ∈ N \Dv
=
{













if i1 ∈ N \Dv
=
{













if i2 ∈ N \Dv
=
{












if i2 ∈ N \Dv
= Γi2(v).
Hence, the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies symmetry.
Lemma A.2.
The procedural egalitarian solution satisfies dummy invariance.
Proof. Let v ∈ TUN and let i ∈ N such that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ∈ 2N for
which i /∈ S. For all S ∈ Av,nv for which i ∈ S we can write
v(S \ {i}) = v(S)− v({i}) =
∑
j∈S
γ̂vj − v({i}) ≥
∑
j∈S
γ̂vj − γ̂vi =
∑
j∈S\{i}
γ̂vj ≥ v(S \ {i}).
This implies γ̂vi = v({i}). For all S ∈ Av,n
v
for which i /∈ S we can write









This implies S ∪ {i} ∈ Av,nv . This means that i ∈ Dv, so we have Γi(v) = γ̂vi = v({i}).
Hence, the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies dummy invariance.
Lemma A.3.
The procedural egalitarian solution satisfies weak covariance.
Proof. Let v ∈ TUN , let a ∈ R++ and let b ∈ R. Define v′ ∈ TUN by v′(S) = av(S) + b|S|












+ b = aχv,1i (S) + b.
Then we have
Av
′,1 = {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} | ∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : χv
′,1
i (T ) ≤ χ
v′,1
i (S)}
= {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} | ∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : aχv,1i (T ) + b ≤ aχ
v,1
i (S) + b}













S = P v,1.





i (S) = aχ
v,1
i (S) + b = aγ
v,1
i + b.
Let k ∈ N and assume that χv
′,k
i (S) = aχ
v,k
i (S) + b for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and any i ∈ S,




i + b for all i ∈ P v
′,k. Then we can write for all






































+ b if i ∈ S \ P v,k
= aχv,k+1i (S) + b.
Then we have
Av





i (S) = v
′(S),∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : χv
′,k+1
i (T ) ≤ χ
v′,k+1
i (S)}
= {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} |
∑
i∈S
(aχv,k+1i (S) + b) = av(S) + b|S|,
∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : aχv,k+1i (T ) + b ≤ aχ
v,k+1
i (S) + b}
= {S ∈ 2N \ {∅} |
∑
i∈S
χv,k+1i (S) = v(S),∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : χ
v,k+1












S = P v,k+1.





i (S) = aχ
v,k+1
i (S) + b = aγ
v,k+1
i + b.
This means that for all k ∈ N we have χv
′,k
i (S) = aχ
v,k
i (S) + b for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and any




i + b for all i ∈ P v
′,k. Then we have
nv
′
= min{k ∈ N | P v
′,k = N} = min{k ∈ N | P v,k = N} = nv,
Âv
′





′ : S 6⊂ T} = {S ∈ Av,n
v





































































































j )j∈N\Dv + b.







































if i ∈ N \Dv
=
{
aγ̂vi + b if i ∈ Dv;
min
{







j )j∈N\Dv + b
}
if i ∈ N \Dv
=
{












+ b if i ∈ N \Dv
=
{











+ b if i ∈ N \Dv
= aΓi(v) + b.
Hence, the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies weak covariance.
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